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This paper reviews theoretical and empirical literature on the household distribution of 
the costs and benefits of pollution control policies, and ways of integrating distributional issues 
into environmental cost/benefit analysis. Most studies find that policy costs fall 
disproportionately on poorer groups, though this is less pronounced when lifetime income is 
used, and policies affect prices of inputs used pervasively across the economy. The policy 
instrument itself is also critical; freely allocated emission permits may hurt the poor the most, as 
they transfer income to shareholders via scarcity rents created by higher prices, while emissions 
taxes offer opportunities for progressive revenue recycling. And although low-income 
households appear to bear a disproportionate share of environmental risks, policies that reduce 
risks are not always progressive, for example, they may alter property values in ways that benefit 
the wealthy. The review concludes by noting a number of areas where future research is badly 
needed. 
   1
The Incidence of Pollution Control Policies 
 




  Economic evaluations of pollution control policies have traditionally focused on pure 
efficiency effects⎯either a comparison of their economic costs and environmental benefits, or a 
comparison of their costs relative to those of alternative control policies (e.g., Cropper and Oates 
1992, Morgenstern 1997, Hahn 2005). However, the distribution of policy costs and benefits 
across households and firms is receiving increasing attention among researchers and 
policymakers.
1 One reason is concern about whether a policy is “fair” or not. Another is political 
feasibility⎯a policy justifiable on efficiency grounds may be impractical if it imposes a 
disproportionate burden on a politically influential group. Often the two are critically related; for 
example, political opposition to higher fuel taxes, carbon taxes, or other emissions taxes in the 
United States is frequently based on the claim that such taxes fall most heavily on low-income 
groups. The purpose of this paper is to summarize what is actually known, and not known, about 
the incidence of benefits and costs from pollution taxes, and alternative emissions control 
measures, across household income groups. 
  Distributional issues have many diverse dimensions and we omit a number of topics, 
some of which have been comprehensively reviewed elsewhere. We do not discuss racial 
incidence. Evidence on this is discussed in Hamilton (2005); the main finding is that, in addition 
to income, other factors such as lack of participation in local decision-making, explain the 
disproportionate burden of environmental risks borne by minorities. We only briefly touch on 
incidence across consumers versus producers and across capital versus labor; Fullerton and 
Metcalf (2002) have recently reviewed the extensive public finance literature on such issues. 
And we do not discuss regional incidence within a country, nor inter-generational and inter-
country incidence.
2 Finally, most of our discussion applies to local and global air pollution 
                                                 
1 For example, in 1994 the Clinton Administration directed the EPA to study the pattern of environmental hazards 
across different income and racial groups and to explore options for reducing disparities.  
2 The latter two issues are particularly contentious in climate policy. Estimated future damages from atmospheric 
accumulation of greenhouse gases are highly sensitive to assumptions about long range discount rates, and whether   2
policies in the United States and Europe, as that is where the bulk of empirical efforts have been 
focused.
3  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a conceptual framework for 
understanding and measuring the burden on different income groups from the costs of alternative 
emissions control instruments. Section 3 summarizes various empirical studies on how the costs 
of emissions taxes, emissions permits, and command and control policies are distributed across 
households. Section 4 discusses the distributional pattern of benefits from emissions control 
policies. Section 5 briefly discusses three ways in which distributional considerations might be 
integrated into traditional cost/benefit analyses of environmental policies. Section 6 summarizes 
the main findings from the review and lists important topics for future research. 
  
2. Conceptual Issues  
 
  This section provides a highly simplified theoretical framework to help interpret results 
from more sophisticated empirical models discussed in Section 3. Our main focus is on pollution 
taxes in a competitive, partial equilibrium setting; we also touch on measurement issues, other 
forms of regulation, and complications due to non-competitive pricing and general equilibrium 




Product Taxes  
To start with, consider the taxation of a single polluting commodity X (e.g., gasoline, 
electricity) which is produced by competitive firms under constant returns and consumed by all i 
= 1…N individuals in the economy. Individuals differ according to income level Ii. Prior to the 
introduction of the tax, the product price 
0
X X p p = , where 
0
X p  is the producer price, 
consumption for household i is 
0
i X , and consumer surplus is triangle abc in Figure 1. With a 
specific tax  X t  the consumer price is  X X X t p p + =
0 1 ; the burden of the tax for household i, prior 
                                                                                                                                                             
different weights are attached to the welfare of poor nations that are most vulnerable to climate change (see e.g., 
Portney and Weyant 1999, Azar and Sterner 1996, Carraro 2000, Stevens and Rose 2002).   3
to recycling of revenues, is the consumer surplus loss, trapezoid decb in Figure 1. This consists 
of the first order tax payment rectangle degb equal to 
1
i X X t , and a second order loss from the 
reduction in consumption, triangle ecg equal to  2 / ) )( / (
2
X X i t p X ∂ ∂ −  (assuming linear demand 
over the relevant range). Alternatively, the burden is the tax payment with no change in 
consumption rectangle dfcb equal to 
0
i X X t , less triangle efc equal to  2 / ) )( / (
2
X X i t p X ∂ ∂ − , the 
saving in spending, net of forgone consumption benefits, from the reduction in consumption.  
We define the (initial) own-price elasticity of demand for household i by 
0 / ) / (
0 0 < ∂ ∂ = i X X i Xi X p p X η . Using this and the above expressions, the burden to household i 
(Bi) can be written: 
(2.1)  i B  2 / ) / (
0 0 2 0 1
Xi i X X X i X X p p t X t η − = 2 / ) / (
0 0 2 0 0
Xi i X X X i X X p p t X t η + =  
For small tax changes the second order effect from the behavioral response to the tax is 
small relative to the first order effect of the price increase (ecg is small relative to degb, or efc is 
small relative to dfcb, in Figure 1); thus it is reasonable to ignore the second order effect. In this 
case the burden, expressed relative to income, is approximately given by: 
(2.2) 
0 0 ) / ( / Xi X X i i s p t I B ≈  
where  i i X Xi I X p s /
0 0 0 =  is the (initial) budget share. In this case, whether policy costs are 
progressive/proportional/regressive (i.e. whether the burden relative to income rises, is constant 
or falls with income) depends on whether the budget share is lower/the same/greater for low-
income households than for high-income households. 
 
Emissions taxes 
Efficient environmental taxes are levied on emissions, rather than a consumption good, 
and thus ultimately may affect final product prices across a range of industries. Suppose a tax of 
tE is levied on pollution emissions and that emissions are released during the production of j = 
1…M consumption goods. Firms producing good j will reduce emissions per unit of output until 
the incremental abatement cost (e.g., from end-of-pipe treatment or from substituting cleaner 
inputs in production) equals the emissions tax. In Figure 2, the tax-induced abatement is 
                                                                                                                                                             
3 We do not cover incidence of solid waste policies and noise pollution; for some discussion of these issues see 
Kinnaman and Fullerton (2000), Feitelson et al. (1996), and Ashenmiller (2004).   4
therefore  j j e e −
0 , where ej denotes emissions per unit of output. Assuming firm costs are fully 
passed forward to consumers (see below), the price of good j is: 
(2.3) 
0 0 1 ) ( j j j j j E j p e e c e t p + − + =  
where  j Ee t  is the emissions tax payment per unit of output, rectangle acdb in Figure 2, cj(.) is 
the resource cost from abatement per unit of output, area 0ab, and 
0
j p  is the initial producer 
price.  
  Using analogous expressions to (2.1) for the burden of price increases, aggregating over 
all goods and dividing by income, the burden of the emissions tax can be expressed: 







ji ij j ji j i i s p s p I B
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0 0 2 0 ˆ
2
1 ˆ / η  
(2.4b) 
0 0 1 / ) ( ˆ j j j j p p p p − =
0 / (.)) ( j j j E p c e t + = ,  i ji j ji I X p s /
0 0 0 =  
where  j p ˆ  is the proportionate increase in price of product j and 
0
ji s  is household i’s (initial) 
budget share for good j. As before, the burden amounts to first order surplus losses from the 
increase in prices at initial consumption, less second order gains from the reduction in 
consumption. And ignoring the second order terms is reasonable when the proportionate change 
in product prices is small (
2 ˆ j p  is small relative to  j p ˆ ).  
 
Revenue Recycling 
Many empirical studies do not consider recycling of environmental tax revenues in other 
tax reductions, even though overall incidence impacts are very sensitive to the form of recycling. 
Consider, for example, the case of one polluting good. With  p ˆ ∆  small, the burden with revenue 
recycling for household i would be 
(2.5)  i i i i s p I B α − ≈
0 ˆ / 
where αi is the rebate from revenue recycling as a proportion of household i’s income. Clearly, 
the regressivity of the tax could be reduced if the rebate were larger as a fraction of income for 
low-income households than for high-income households (for example, if revenues financed an 
increase in income tax thresholds). 
 
   5
Indexing of Transfer Payments 
Many transfer programs (e.g., social security) are indexed for price changes suggesting 
that low-income households may receive some compensation, even prior to recycling of 
revenues. This is a significant consideration, taken into account in some studies. However, not all 
low-income households receive transfer payments; moreover, low-income families often have 
relatively high budget shares for energy and polluting goods, implying that they will be under-
compensated from price indices that weight these goods according to budget shares of the 
average household.  
 
Measurement Issues 
We now comment briefly on the measurement of variables that enter into the net burden 
formula (2.4).  
 
Household Expenditure on Final Products 
This is available from household data sources, such as the Consumer Expenditure Survey 
(CES) in the United States. 
 
Household Income 
Measurement of household income is tricky. In principle lifetime income is a better 
measure of an individual’s well being than current income. For example, Harvard MBA students 
may have low current income, but are not poor in a lifetime context given their high, expected 
future earnings. In addition, a reasonably well-off person may appear poor in a particular year 
due to transitory factors, such as temporary unemployment, illness, extended maternity leave, 
etc. Lifetime measures of income are designed to remove the confounding effects of similar 
people being at different stages of their lifecycle, and short-term variation in earnings; incidence 
estimates based on lifetime income tend to be significantly less regressive than those based on 
annual income.  
However, lifetime income is far more difficult to measure than current income, as it 
requires tracking households over extremely long time periods. Earlier studies by Poterba (1989) 
of federal excise taxes and Metcalf (1994) of state and local sales taxes, proxied lifetime income 
by annual consumption, based on the Friedman/Modigliani permanent income and lifecycle   6
models; with perfect lifecycle consumption smoothing, current consumption is proportional to 
lifetime income. However evidence suggests that the lifetime consumption trajectory is not flat 
but has an inverted-U shape, due in part to liquidity constraints (e.g., Bull et al. 1994, Zeldes 
1989, Souleles 1999 and 2002), and that consumption is responsive to changes in the timing of 
income (Shapiro and Slemrod, 1994); these findings are inconsistent with the lifetime income 
hypothesis. Some more recent studies therefore use econometric methods relating income to 
education, age, and other demographic variables to construct more sophisticated measures of 
lifetime income.
4 Even this approach is not entirely satisfactory, as it does not consider all 
potentially important factors determining income and it implicitly assumes that the status of a 
person observed at a single point in time stays the same forever;
5 some authors even argue 
against using the lifetime income concept in policy analysis at all (Barthold, 1993). Given the 
controversy surrounding income measurement, studies often report results for a range of 
alternative income definitions. 
 
Change in Product Prices 
The tax component of changes in final goods prices can be obtained using input-output 
tables that trace all intermediate goods going into final goods production (e.g., from the Bureau 
of Economic Analysis), and data on emissions factors for polluting inputs (e.g., from EPA 1996). 
Direct estimates of the abatement cost component of price increases might be unavailable, and 






                                                 
4 See for example Fullerton and Rogers (1993), Casperson and Metcalf (1994), Walls and Hansen (1999), Slesnick 
(1994), and the discussion in Metcalf (1999). An alternative approach is cohort analysis (e.g., Gale et al. 1996), 
which considers only households at similar stages of their life cycle; however this approach does not address the 
problem of annual income variation. 
5 For example, if we observe that a person has 14 years of education, we have know way of knowing whether they 
will go to college for two more years and earn a Bachelors degree or not. 
6 If abatement costs are unknown they could be approximated by  2 / ) (
0
j j E e e t − , if it is reasonable to assume 
marginal costs are linear over the relevant range (this is easily seen from Figure 2). If not, abatement costs can be 
bounded by {0, tE(e0−e)}. 
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Estimates of product demand elasticities for different household income groups have only 
recently begun to emerge from analyses of micro data (e.g., West 2004a). Previous empirical 
studies that included behavioral responses usually assumed proportionate demand changes were 
the same across all households.  
  One subtle issue is that the second-order component of the change in household welfare 
differs according to whether it is measured by consumer surplus, equivalent variation, or 
compensating variation; in the former case the welfare change is the relevant area under the 
uncompensated demand curve, while in the latter cases it is measured with respect to 
compensated demand curves. For individual product price increases there is usually very little 
difference between the three welfare measures, so long as the share of spending on this good is a 
small fraction of income;
7 but this may not be the case when a wide range of product prices are 
simultaneously increased, and the relevant budget share is more substantial. 
 
Other Control Instruments 
For simplicity, in the discussion below we assume an emissions policy affects the price of 
just one commodity X.  
 
Tradable Emissions Permits 
Tradable permits have essentially the same distributional effects as an emissions tax that 
would induce the equivalent emissions reduction, if the permits are fully auctioned. That is, if the 
equilibrium permit price is τ, then analogous expressions to equations (2.3) and (2.4) apply 
again, with tE replaced by τ.
8 
Effects are quite different, however, if permits are given out for free (Dinan and Rogers 
2002, Parry 2004).
9 The reason is that, rather than going to the government, permit rents are 
reflected in higher firm equity values because firms receive an asset with market value for free. 
The permit cap acts rather like a binding production quota, or a cartel where members agree to 
                                                 
7 See Willig (1976). From the Slutsky equation, the difference between the uncompensated and compensated own-
price demand elasticity equals the income elasticity times the budget share.  
8 For each unit of emissions firms must either buy a permit from other firms, or forgo selling one of their permits; 
either way the cost to the firm is τ, and firms will abatement until the incremental cost equals τ. This leaves aside 
some complications, such as transactions costs to permit trading and uncertainty over control costs.  
9 Nearly all permits have been given out for free in existing programs, including those to reduce the lead content of 
gasoline, ozone-depleting chemicals, and utility emissions of SO2 in the United States, and the CO2 trading program 
introduced in the European Union in January 2005.   8
limit their production; in all cases output is reduced below free market levels and product prices 
and firm profits are increased. Ultimately permit rents accrue to households in the form of 
dividends or capital gains; in terms of equation (2.4a), there is now an income term,  i i I / π , 
subtracted from the right-hand side, where πi is profit income for household i arising from permit 
rents. To the extent that wealthy households receive a greater share of their income from capital 
than poor households, that is  i i I / π  increases with Ii, the creation of scarcity rents is regressive.  
  In fact, it is possible that high-income households are actually made better off under 
grandfathered permits (excluding environmental benefits), while low-income households are 
substantially worse off! To see this suppose, for simplicity, that half the population has high 
income (H), the other half has low income (L), and high-income households own all the capital. 
Suppose also that we can ignore second order effects. Then burden for high- and low-income 
households is given by: 
(2.6)  H H X X H X p p B π − − ≈
0 0 1 ) ( ,  
0 0 1 ) ( L X X L X p p B − ≈  
where ) (
0 0 1
X X X X e e c e p p − + = − τ is the product price increase and πH is capital or profit income 
per high-income household. The latter equals the permit rents  ) (
0 0
H L X X e + τ , equal to the permit 
price τ times emissions  ) (
0 0
H L X X e + . Low-income households receive no compensation and are 
unambiguously worse off (BL > 0). However high-income households could be better off overall 
(BH < 0); in our highly simplified example, this occurs when permit rents are large enough 
relative to abatement costs so that  ) ) ( ) (
0 0 0
H L H X c e X X e + > + τ τ  or 
0 0 / / L H X X c e > τ . 
  Several subtle considerations weaken, though not necessarily overturn, the prospects for 
this perverse equity effect. First, the share of permit rents, vis-à-vis the share of abatement costs, 
in the product price increase typically diminishes at higher levels of abatement, at least with 
linear (though perhaps not convex) marginal abatement costs, that is, τe (rectangle acdb in 
Figure 2) decreases in size relative to c(.) (triangle 0ab). Thus, the prospects for rent income to 
overcompensate high-income households for the price increase diminishes with the level of 
abatement. Second, a significant portion of the permit rents (around 35% in the United States) 
will still go, albeit indirectly, to the government rather than owners of capital, via corporate taxes 
paid on additional profits, and personal income and capital gains taxes on additional household 
income. Third, capital income is not exclusively earned by high-income households; even low-  9
income households may have some capital income in the form of retirement accounts.
10 Fourth, 
as discussed below, the price effects of tradable permits, and hence the rent transfer from 
consumers to shareholders, is sensitive to assumptions about returns to scale, market structure, 
and possible differences between marginal and non-marginal production technologies.   
 
Command and Control Regulation 
Suppose firms must satisfy a performance standard that imposes a limitation of e  on 
emissions per unit of output. With homogeneous firms each firm’s abatement cost per unit is 
) (
0 e e c −  and the product price is 
0 0 1 ) ( X X p e e c p + − = . That is, there is no tax revenue/permit 
rent component to the price increase.
11 Thus, the policy avoids the adverse distributional 
consequence of freely allocated permits that arises from the transfer of rent income to high-
income households; whether the policy is progressive or regressive essentially depends on 
budget shares across income groups.  
  In fact, for a given emissions reduction, low-income households could be worse off under 
grandfathered permits than under the performance standard; although the pure abatement costs 
are lower under permits, the difference could be more than offset by the price effect of permit 
rents (Goulder et al. 1999). The same qualitative result could still apply, though is less likely, if 
firms are heterogeneous (and abatement costs are not minimized across firms), or under an end-
of-pipe technology mandate (where firms cannot exploit the least-cost combination of measures 
to reduce emissions per unit of output, including substitution of clean for dirty inputs).  
 
Complicating Factors  
So far we have assumed that all policy costs are fully passed forward to consumers, the 
standard approach taken in input-output analyses discussed below. However there are various 
                                                 
10 For the United States, total stock and bond ownership across households can be measured from the CES; Dinan 
and Rogers (2002) and Parry (2004) compute that the top income quintile owns 86% and 53% of total stocks, 
respectively. The difference is that Parry includes retirement capital, which is more evenly dispersed among income 
groups than non-retirement financial capital, while Dinan and Rogers exclude it.  
Ideally information should be used on stock ownership in polluting firms, rather than total stock ownership 
across all firms, but the former is particularly difficult to obtain, given households own most of their stocks 
indirectly through large institutional investors. 
11 This is because there is no binding quota imposed on economy-wide emissions; new firms are free to enter the 
market without having to buy emissions permits from incumbent firms. Similarly, no rents would be created if the 
government took an existing command and control system and allowed firms to trade credits, unless the government 
also imposed a cap on economy wide emissions below the initial level.    10
complications that may affect the impact of environmental policies on product prices, and 
policies may also affect prices in (economy-wide) factor markets. 
 
Upward Sloping Supply Curves 
Even in the long run supply curves may still be upward sloping (rather than perfectly 
elastic as assumed above), due to rising marginal costs of using an input, such as a scarce natural 
resource, or industry-specific capital. In this case part of the burden of an emissions tax or other 
regulation will come at the expense of reducing producer prices and producer surplus, or pure 
firm profits, rather than higher product prices. This ultimately passes some of the burden back to 
shareholders in the form of lower equity values or dividend payouts. The effect is progressive 
since wealthier households earn a larger share of their income from capital. 
 
Non-Competitive Pricing 
The assumption of competitive pricing may be unrealistic; this is particularly the case for 
electricity generation, which is a major contributor to global and local air pollution. Currently, 
well over half of generated electricity in the United States is subject to regulated prices, though 
this fraction will diminish in future with continued restructuring (Brennan et al. 2002). In states 
where generation prices are regulated, the opportunity cost of using grandfathered permits to 
cover emissions is not passed on in higher prices (Burtraw et al. 2001, pp. 7). But even in 
deregulated markets, abatement costs may in part come at the expense of profits (and ultimately 
shareholders) rather than being fully passed forward, if firms have market power (e.g., 
Borenstein et al. 2002). Dominant firms may exercise market power in regional electricity 
markets when fringe competitors become capacity constrained at peak period, and congestion on 
the grid prevents the import of power from other regions. 
 
Multiple Production Technologies 
In electricity generation different technologies are often used to supply baseload and peak 
demand. At peak period infra-marginal production is often from coal plants, which have a high 
emissions intensity, while marginal production is often from natural gas plants, which have 
lower emissions intensity (in the case of carbon and NOx) or zero emissions (in the case of SO2). 
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Consequently, abatement costs for coal plants at peak period will not be fully passed on in higher 
prices; they will, at least in part, come at the expense of rents earned on infra-marginal 
production (in Parry’s 2005 analysis of the SO2 trading program this dampens the effect on 
product prices by about 45%). Again, some of the burden is passed back to owners of capital.  
 
Changes in Economy-wide Factor Prices 
A recent general equilibrium analysis by Fullerton and Heutel (2004) explores the extent 
to which pollution taxes affect the economy-wide rate of return from capital relative to that from 
labor. They study a closed economy with labor and capital in fixed aggregate supply but mobile 
across industries, and two competitive, constant returns industries producing a clean good and a 
dirty good.
 They show that if the elasticity of substitution between polluting inputs and labor is 
the same as that for polluting inputs and capital, then a pollution tax will usually lower the 
relative return of the factor that is used more intensively in the dirty sector. Polluting industries 
tend to be relatively capital intensive (Antweiler et al. 2001, p. 879), implying that emissions 
taxes may enact a transfer from (wealthy) households with a relatively high capital income share 
to (poor) households with a relatively high labor income share. In this regard, most empirical 
studies of pollution control incidence may overstate policy regressivity, as they do not account 
for changes in economy-wide factor prices.
12 
3. Empirical Studies  
 
This section begins by discussing the sizeable empirical literature on environmental 
taxes, and the much more limited one on emissions permits; for these policies the primary 
incidence effects are transparent, assuming tax payments or permit rents are fully passed on in 
higher prices. We then summarize older literature on command and control policies and overall 
federal environmental programs in the United States. Here, price effects must be inferred from 
estimates of abatement costs, which may be inaccurate since analysts and researchers often have 
imperfect information on firms’ costs.  
                                                 
12 However, results from general equilibrium incidence models are notoriously complex and ambiguous. For 
example, to the extent that the net return on capital is determined on world capital markets, this will cushion the 
potential fall in the relative return to capital. On the other hand, allowing for imperfect mobility of capital across 
industries may increase the burden that can be borne by capital. And more generally results also depend on the 
relative substitutability of labor and capital for polluting inputs, about which very little is known. Theoretical results 
on the general equilibrium incidence of pollution mandates have similar ambiguities (Fullerton and Heutel 2005). 
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Care is needed in comparing studies as they may measure incidence and household 
income differently, some studies account for behavioral responses to price rises induced by the 
policies while others do not, and some rely on a partial equilibrium framework while others take 
a general equilibrium approach.  
 
Environmental Taxes 
A substantial literature exists on a variety of energy taxes, including, gasoline and carbon 
taxes, and this forms the bulk of the work reviewed here. A general finding is that, prior to 
revenue recycling and on the basis of annual income, most environmental taxes look regressive 
because lower income households tend to spend a disproportionately larger fraction of their 
income on energy, which is a necessity good. Using lifetime income, taking account of increases 
in prices of other goods for which energy is an input, and recycling revenues can mitigate this 
regressivity, at least in part. Our review captures some of the most important published work in 
the area but is not meant to be exhaustive; rather, we provide a flavor for the literature, and note 
consensus on results if and where it exists. 
 
Gasoline Taxes 
A gasoline tax is, for the most part, a final product tax and thus has effects as we 
described in section 2.1.1 above. Poterba’s (1989) study of gasoline taxes (and other federal 
excise taxes) was among the first to emphasize the quantitative significance of different 
measures of income for the degree of regressivity (see also Poterba 1991). He used CES data and 
computed the budget share on gasoline for each household.  He found that the budget share of 
the bottom income quintile was 5.3 times that for the top income quintile when annual income is 
used, but 1.5 times that for the top income quintile when lifetime income, as proxied by annual 
consumption expenditure, is used.  
Using data from the CES, West and Williams (2004) examine the incidence of an 
increase in the (federal and state) gasoline tax from its current level of about $0.40 per gallon to 
$1 per gallon, again with consumption as a proxy for lifetime income. Unlike Poterba, they 
account for behavioral responses in their incidence calculations, by econometrically estimating 
gasoline demand elasticities by income quintile. They find that the gasoline tax is generally 
regressive prior to revenue recycling. Regressivity is reduced if revenues are returned through an   13
equal percentage reduction in the marginal tax rate on labor income for each income group. This 
occurs because labor income is a greater fraction of total income for low-income households than 
for high-income households. The regressivity of the gasoline tax increase is eliminated altogether 
if revenues are returned in equal lump-sum transfers for all households; in fact, in this scenario, 
the bottom two quintiles are actually better off overall. The authors also find that ignoring 
demand responses (i.e. computing rectangle dfcb rather than trapezoid decb in Figure 1), or 
assuming the same gasoline demand elasticity across different income groups, makes the tax 
increase appear more regressive; this is because lower income groups have more elastic demands 
for gasoline, implying a disproportionate reduction in their burden from demand responses. 
Finally, they find little discrepancy in incidence effects between welfare measures based on 
consumer surplus and equivalent variation. 
Although revenues from a future fuel tax increase might finance other tax cuts, revenues 
from the current fuel tax are earmarked for highways. Interestingly, Wiese et al. (1995), using a 
computational general equilibrium model, find that existing gasoline taxes are actually 
progressive, as highway spending bids up the demand for manual labor and relative wages of the 
bottom income quartile. Progressivity declines if some of the tax receipts are instead diverted to 
the general government and deficit reduction. 
Bento et al. (2005) use the 2001 National Highway Transportation Survey (NHTS), a 
large US household survey dataset, to estimate a random coefficients model of vehicle choice 
and miles traveled, and combine that with a model of vehicle scrappage as well as a model of 
Bertrand competition (across manufacturers) in the new car market. They simulate a 10, 30, and 
50 cent per gallon increase in the gasoline tax under scenarios when revenues are rebated to 
households in proportion to their gasoline tax payments and in proportion to income. The authors 
find that with tax-based recycling, the impact of the tax across income groups is close to 
proportional. With income-based recycling, on the other hand, low-income households pay more 
as a percentage of income than high-income households.
13 
 
Other Energy Taxes and Carbon Taxes 
                                                 
13 Although Bento et al. allow for scrappage and changes in vehicle holdings, their simulations only consider 
impacts in the first year after the policy and not longer run impacts.  Future work by the authors will conduct a more 
long-run analysis.   14
The studies just discussed assume that gasoline is a final good, directly consumed by 
households; this is reasonable, because household consumption accounts for the bulk of gasoline 
use. However, it is not reasonable for many other goods that might be taxed on environmental 
grounds. For example, direct household consumption accounts for only about two-fifths of 
electricity sales; the remainder is split about equally between industrial and commercial users, 
and is effectively an intermediate good in the production of consumer products. In this case it is 
potentially important to account for increases in prices of other final goods that are indirectly 
affected by the tax.  
In their study of taxes on electricity, coal, natural gas, gasoline and other refined 
petroleum products, Casler and Rafiqui (1993) compute price effects on 89 final goods 
consumed by households, using input-output tables. They assume that taxes are fully passed 
forward to consumers, and that firm’s input-output ratios and household product demands are 
fixed. Price calculations are combined with CES data on the 89 commodities by income quintile, 
and income is measured on an annual basis. They find that the greater the share of output from 
the taxed good that is an intermediate, as opposed to final good, the less regressive the tax. 
Overall, the tax burden to income ratio for the lowest quintile is only modestly larger than that 
for the top quintile across the various taxes. 
Bull et al. (1994) use the same data sources and a similar approach to analyze a tax based 
on energy content, i.e., a Btu tax, and a tax based on carbon content. However, they consider a 
broader range of household income measures than Casler and Rafiqui, including annual income, 
annual consumption, and lifetime income.
14 Like Casler and Rafiqui, they find that on the basis 
of annual income the direct components of Btu and carbon taxes look quite regressive, while the 
indirect components are less regressive. On the basis of lifetime income, the direct component 
remains regressive but the indirect component becomes mildly progressive; overall, the taxes 
look much less regressive on a lifetime income basis than on an annual income basis. 
In a third study employing similar data and methods, Metcalf (1999) analyzes a revenue-
neutral package of environmental taxes, including a carbon tax, an increase in motor fuel taxes, 
taxes on various stationary source emissions, and a virgin materials tax; revenues from this 
                                                 
14 The lifetime measure is obtained by calculating a “typical” consumption path for various subgroups defined by 
age and education, and constructing lifetime consumption for each individual in the sample by scaling their current 
consumption relative to the average for their age/education subgroup. A similar exercise is carried out to obtain   15
package amount to 10% of federal income tax revenue. Prices of energy goods⎯electricity, 
natural gas, fuel oil and gasoline⎯increase substantially under these measures (by 14 to 27%), 
while prices of all other consumer goods increase by less than 5%. Although the taxes 
disproportionately hit low-income groups, Metcalf shows that the overall package can be made 
distributionally neutral (under a range of different income measures) through careful targeting of 
income and payroll tax reductions.  
  Cornwell and Creedy (1997) use data from the1984 Australian Household Expenditure 
Survey to estimate parameters of a linear expenditure system for different income groups and 
then use these parameters to calculate compensating and equivalent variations resulting from a 
carbon tax.  The authors assume that the carbon tax is fully passed forward to consumers and that 
the prices of goods increase in proportion to their carbon content.  They find that the tax is 
regressive, on the basis of annual income: both compensating and equivalent variation as a 
fraction of income fall as income rises. They also show how a “minimum income guarantee” 
could be increased and offset the regressive effects of the tax. 
  Brännlund and Nördstrom (2004) use data from Sweden to analyze a carbon tax with 
revenues recycled in a reduction in the general value-added tax (VAT), or in a reduction in the 
VAT on public transport.
15 The authors use the Swedish Household Expenditure Survey, 
combined with aggregate data from the National Accounts, to estimate the demand for 
nondurable goods. They obtain price elasticities that vary by income quintile then simulate the 
effects of the tax policies. They find that the tax is regressive under the first recycling scenario, 
but less regressive in the second. Larger differences show up regionally in the second 
scenario⎯city dwellers benefit from the policy while rural households are hurt. 
Unlike other studies that consider proposed carbon taxes, Wier et al. (2005) examine the 
existing CO2 tax in Denmark, based on actual taxes paid directly and indirectly by households. 
They use input-output tables from Denmark for the year 1996, assuming taxes are fully passed 
through to consumers in higher product prices, and a consumer expenditure survey of over 3,400 
households. On the basis of annual income, Wier et al. find that (excluding use of revenues) the 
CO2 tax is regressive: households in the lowest income decile paid approximately 0.8% of their 
disposable income in taxes, while households in the highest decile paid less than 0.3%. Again, 
                                                                                                                                                             
measures of lifetime direct and indirect energy taxes paid; lifetime incidence is lifetime taxes paid as a percentage of 
lifetime consumption.   16
the direct component of the tax accounts for most of the regressivity. Using total expenditures as 
a proxy for lifetime income, Wier et al. find that the regressivity is greatly reduced, though not 
entirely eliminated. 
 
Motor Vehicle Taxes 
  Walls and Hanson (1999) combine motor vehicle emissions per mile data from a remote 
sensing experiment in California with vehicle mileage data by household obtained from the 
NHTS to study the replacement of existing vehicle registration fees by taxes on total yearly 
emissions, emissions per mile, and vehicle miles traveled.
16 The authors construct a measure of 
lifetime income for each household in their dataset using a relationship between education and 
demographic data and lifetime income estimated earlier by Rogers (1993).  
  They find that, regardless of whether annual or lifetime income is used, the tax on 
emissions per mile is more regressive than the emissions tax, which in turn is more regressive 
than the tax on miles driven; this is because ownership of older, dirtier vehicles with higher 
emission rates is disproportionately concentrated among lower income households. They also 
find that the mileage tax looks more regressive than existing registration fees, which are based on 
vehicle value, on an annual income basis, though not on a lifetime income basis; this is because 
the mileage/income relation is weaker than the vehicle value/income relation on an annual basis, 
but this difference disappears under the lifetime income measure. Finally, adverse distributional 
effects of any of the three new taxes are diminished if revenues raised are used to reduce existing 
registration fees, which are themselves regressive.  
West (2004a) integrates behavioral responses into an incidence analysis of motor vehicle 
taxes and subsidies based on an econometric model of household vehicle choice and mileage 
estimated with CES data. The policies she considers are a tax on vehicle size, a mileage tax, and 
a subsidy to vehicle “newness.” She finds that households in the lower income deciles have more 
elastic demands for miles traveled than those in the higher income deciles. Consequently looking 
                                                                                                                                                             
15 For revenue neutrality in the second scenario, they end up with an ad valorem transport subsidy of 23%. 
16 In principle, the emissions tax is the most efficient one, as it encourages abatement measures to reduce emissions 
per unit of fuel, improvements in fuel economy, and reduced driving. The other two taxes do not optimally exploit 
all of these behavioral responses. Emission taxes could be implemented based on data collected during periodic 
emissions rate inspections, and mileage data collected during the same inspection, or on a continuous basis via 
Global Positioning Systems. Ideally, an emissions tax would also vary by location, time of day, and temperature, as 
all these factors influence marginal pollution damages. At the present time, it is probably still impractical to 
implement a perfect emissions tax.   17
at estimated tax payments as a share of lifetime income (proxied by annual consumption), 
without considering behavioral responses overstates the true regressivity of a mileage tax (see 
above). West finds, however, that the mileage tax is still regressive, even after accounting for 
behavioral responses. Interestingly, the tax payments as a share of income, or consumer surplus 
change as a share of income, become larger from the lowest decile to the middle deciles, but then 
fall after that, and drop sharply for the top decile. Some of this impact is due to low-income 
households who do not own a vehicle: the regressivity of the tax is greater when only households 
who own vehicles are considered. Finally, West also finds that both the subsidy for new vehicles 
and a tax on vehicle size are significantly regressive, more so than the mileage tax.
 17 
 
 Emissions Permits 
Dinan and Rogers (2002) provided the first major contribution on the incidence of 
emissions permits; they considered a program to reduce US carbon emissions by 15% below 
1998 levels (at a permit price of $100 per ton of carbon). They extend the modeling framework 
of Casler and Rafiqui (1993) to incorporate behavioral responses (assumed uniform across 
households), indexing of transfer payments (e.g., social security), and they allocate to households 
additional burdens from the effect of higher product prices on reducing real factor returns and 
compounding efficiency costs of pre-existing factor tax distortions (e.g., Goulder et al. 1999).  
Dinan and Rogers’ results show that distributional effects hinge crucially on whether 
permits are grandfathered or auctioned, and whether revenues from permit auctions, or from 
indirect taxation of permit rents, are used to cut payroll taxes, corporate taxes, or provide lump-
sum transfers. For example, they estimate that households in the lowest income quintile would be 
worse off by around $500 per year under grandfathered permits while, due to large indirect 
increases in the value of their stockholdings, households in the top income quintile would be 
better off by around $1,000.
 If instead the permits were auctioned with revenues returned in 
equal lump-sum rebates for all households, they estimate that low-income households would on 
                                                 
17 In a related study, West (2004b) analyzes the same taxes as Walls and Hanson (1999), but integrates differential 
behavioral responses across households. Results are broadly consistent with earlier ones, though the degree of 
regressivity is mitigated somewhat because lower income households are more price responsive than upper income 
households.   18
net be better off by around $300 while high-income households would be worse off by around 
$1,700.
18  
Parry (2004) estimates a simple, calibrated, analytical model with household income 
proxied by consumption to examine the incidence of emissions permits, among other control 
instruments, to control power plant emissions of SO2, carbon, and NOx. He finds that using 
grandfathered emissions permits to reduce carbon emissions by 10%, and NOx emissions by 
30%, can be highly regressive; the top income quintile is made better off while the bottom 
income quintile is made much worse off. The SO2 cap imposed by the 1990 Clean Air Act 
Amendments, which has reduced emissions by roughly 45%, is also regressive but much less so 
than the carbon and NOx policies. This result underscores the point that permit rent relative to 
abatement costs, and hence the relative transfer to wealthy households, is smaller at higher levels 
of emission reductions. 
Rose and Oladosu (2002) use a computable general equilibrium model with 41 
production sectors, four factors of production, and 10 income brackets, to analyze a carbon 
permit trading system that reduces US emissions by 7% below 1990 levels (the original US 
target under the Kyoto Treaty) for a permit price of $128 per ton. With auctioned permits, and 
prior to revenue recycling, the lowest income bracket experiences a burden to income ratio 73% 
larger than that for the top income bracket, reflecting the formers’ larger budget shares for 
energy goods. When revenues are returned in income tax cuts, the policy is approximately 
proportional overall (burden to income ratios are similar across different households).  
 
Command and Control Regulations 
  We now turn to some older literature on the incidence of US federal pollution 
regulations, which have historically been command and control programs. These older studies do 
not consider behavioral responses, and measure income on an annual rather than lifetime basis, 
so they likely overstate the degree of regressivity. Unlike literature discussed above, some of 
these older studies considered both policy benefits and costs; we discuss benefit estimates in the 
next section.  
                                                 
18 On the other hand they find auctioned carbon permits to be regressive if revenues are used to cut payroll taxes, 
and highly regressive if they are used to cut corporate taxes.     19
  Dorfman and Snow (1975) looked at the costs of pollution controls incurred as a result of 
all federal environmental programs, by government, industry, and households. Government 
control costs are assumed to cause proportional increases in income taxes paid by households; 
industry costs are assumed to be fully passed forward in final product prices and are allocated to 
households based on their total consumption expenditures; and household pollution control costs 
are higher prices for vehicles resulting from emissions regulations, allocated on the basis of 
vehicle ownership. The study found the aggregate costs of federal regulations to be regressive 
with burden to income ratios of roughly 2% and 1% for the bottom and top income quintiles 
respectively. A major factor was that emissions standards drive up the price of lower-cost 
vehicles, purchased by poor households, by about the same amount in absolute terms as 
expensive ones, purchased by wealthy households; added costs relative to income are therefore 
greater for low-income households.
19 However, in a similar study confined to the 1970 Clean Air 
Act, Giannessi et al. (1979) find a more complex incidence pattern when smaller household 
groups are disaggregated. They estimate that the bottom income decile incurs a lower burden to 
income ratio than other groups, as they had the lowest vehicle ownership rate.
20 
  A drawback of these early studies is that they match total abatement costs to total 
consumption spending by households. Robison (1985) improves on this by matching estimates of 
price increases for 78 consumption goods with spending on these goods by household class; 
price increases are obtained using input-output tables and abatement costs (for all media) from 
the Pollution Abatement Costs and Expenditures (PACE) data. Results show that the regulations 
imposed on industry are regressive: the poorest 5% of the population paid about 1% of their 
income for such costs, the next 5% of the population paid about 0.6% of their income, with the 
burden continually declining to the richest 5%, which paid only about 0.2% of their income. 
  Lake et al. (1979) examine costs of the 1972 Clean Water Act. They conduct an extensive 
analysis of the implied burden on households from different mechanisms for financing 
municipality water treatment expenses (taxes, sewer fees, bond issues, etc.). Overall costs of 
municipal wastewater treatment remain regressive, despite the federal grant program: the lowest 
                                                 
19 These findings are similar to those in an earlier study by Harrison (1975), though that study looked at only vehicle 
emissions regulations, and also accounted for tax effects and stockholder burdens from reduced profits for vehicle 
manufacturers. Harrison estimated burden to income ratios of 1.5% for the lowest income quintile and 0.8% for the 
top income quintile. 
20 Consistent with Dorfman and Snow, other groups in the lower half of the income distribution suffered a burden to 
income ratio about double that of deciles in the upper half of the distribution.   20
income decile’s burden to income ratio is 3 times that for the highest income decile.  Lake et al. 
also analyze control costs for ten final industries with high levels of wastewater discharge, and 
assign these costs to households based on their consumption patterns. Control costs are highly 
regressive: burden to income ratios are 2.4% and 0.13% respectively for the bottom and top 
income decile. 
Collins (1977) also analyzes the federal grant program embodied in the Clean Water Act, 
focusing on a region in the Midwest rather than the whole nation. He estimates the amount and 
distribution of both the subsidies, and the implied tax increases, by income class. He finds that 
the highest income category benefits the most from the grant program and that middle-income 
groups incur the greatest cost; the lowest income groups get a slight positive benefit. High-
income groups benefit primarily because of the implied subsidies to polluting firms. Ostro (1981) 
replicates Collins’ work for the Boston metropolitan area, but obtains opposite results. In 
particular, he finds that all of the lower and middle-income groups benefit from the grant 
program and the top four income groups lose. These findings are a result of assuming that the 
municipal subsidy accrues to groups in proportion to their water usage and population and a 
larger number of people are in the lower-to-middle income groups than the higher income 
groups.  The author speculates that similar results might be found for other urban areas.
21 
For a number of reasons it would be useful to update and refine the type of analysis in 
these earlier, comprehensive studies of federal environmental regulations. In the last 25 years or 
more the income distribution has become more unequal, household expenditure patterns have 
changed, firms have often found new, radically more efficient ways to reduce pollution, and new 
laws and regulations have imposed new costs. In addition, limitations on the earlier work can be 
overcome; for example, using recent data, we can more accurately estimate lifetime income for 
various demographic groups, based on their current income, educational attainment, and age.   
 
                                                 
21 There is a very small literature on incidence effects of energy efficiency standards for home appliances (e.g., 
refrigerators, washers, dryers), and demand-side management programs. Sutherland (1991) argued that there is a 
positive net burden from appliance standards (higher product prices exceed discounted savings from improved 
energy efficiency) and that the burden is borne disproportionately by poorer households. However, according to 
estimates by Stoft (1993) the net burden of a given standard is quantitatively very small. Sutherland (1994) finds that 
wealthier households are more likely to participate in voluntary utility demand-side management programs (e.g., 
home energy audits, rebates for the purchase of energy efficient) but that such programs do not significantly reduce 
electricity consumption. He speculates that the higher income households who participate are probably being 
subsidized to undertake conservation measures that they would take anyway, suggesting such programs have 
regressive effects.   21
Comparison Across Instruments  
Studies have generally focused on one policy instrument in isolation, rather than 
considering a broad range of alternative instruments. One exception is Parry (2004) who finds 
that the burden imposed on low-income households from control of power plant emissions can 
be lower under performance standards and technology mandates than under grandfathered 
permits (assuming homogeneous firms). For a given emissions reduction, the command-and-
control policies cause higher abatement costs than emission permits as they fail to optimally 
exploit all the different margins for emission reductions; however, the overall product price 
increase is larger under emission permits, as it also reflects the large rents created under the 
policy. More research is needed on how robust this result might be to incorporating 
heterogeneity in abatement costs among firms, different levels of pollution reduction, non-
competitive pricing in the electricity sector, and other factors. 
 
Summary 
Most empirical studies find that the costs of environmental policies are borne 
disproportionately by lower income groups. This appears to hold across a range of policy 
instruments, especially grandfathered emissions permits, though the bulk of empirical work has 
focused on taxes, particularly, energy taxes. The finding is less pronounced for taxes on 
intermediate products than for taxes on final goods, and when some measure of lifetime income 
is used rather than annual income, though measuring lifetime income remains problematic 
especially in cross-section studies. Perhaps the most important finding, and one that deserves 
more attention in future research, is the potential for revenue recycling (from taxes and auctioned 
permits) to mitigate the burden on low-income households. More attention should also be paid to 
the extent to which the burden of environmental policies is passed backwards in reduced returns 
to owners of capital, rather than forward to consumers in higher product prices.  
 
4. Who Benefits From Environmental Policies? 
 
  An abundant “environmental justice” literature examines the distribution of existing 
environmental risks, but we should be cautious about using findings from this literature to make 
inferences about the distribution of welfare gains from policy, for at least four reasons. First, due   22
to a lack of data, the bulk of the environmental justice literature uses measures of environmental 
risk that do not adequately account for the degree of exposure and factors affecting individuals’ 
susceptibility to pollution-induced illness. Second, when policies create non-uniform 
environmental improvements, the existing risk distribution will inaccurately predict 
distributional benefits from the policy change. Third, to translate physical benefits into welfare 
gains we need to measure how different households value environmental quality. Finally, we 
also need to account for the possible effect of changing environmental quality on market prices 
or wages, as these price changes also affect household welfare. All of these issues are taken up in 
this section. 
 
Evidence on the Distribution of Prevailing Environmental Risks 
  Studies have evaluated the existing distribution of environmental risks for many different 
pollutants at many different geographical scales. They merge data on environmental conditions 
with census data on the characteristics of local populations.
22   
  
Findings 
Empirical literature on the distribution of existing environmental risks is so large that it is 
difficult to do justice to the range of methods and results. The discussion here is necessarily 
cursory because of the broader focus of this article and the availability of several comprehensive 
surveys (Bowen 2002, Pearce 2003, Hamilton 2005, and Ringquist 2005). Early studies, which 
focused mainly on air pollution in the United States, generally found a negative association 
between environmental risk and income (e.g., Freeman 1972, Zupan 1973, Asch and Seneca 
1978, Harrison and Rubinfeld 1978). In the 1980s, studies also began to focus on waste 
management facilities and, in the 1990s, on toxic releases, using newly available data from the 
Toxic Release Inventory (TRI). Most of these studies also find that lower income groups suffer 
more exposure to hazardous waste management facilities (e.g., Hamilton 1993 and 1995, Yandle 
                                                 
22 Initially, studies used convenient but approximate measures of affected populations, such as counties or postal 
codes. As techniques for working with geographic information became more sophisticated, researchers were able to 
measure the population residing within certain distances from pollution sources or monitoring stations. However 
tradeoffs arise in the choice of spatial scales (Bowen 2002): with smaller geographical units localized inequities are 
less likely to be overlooked, but measures of individuals’ overall exposure may be less reliable. For example, an 
individual may work near a polluting facility and have considerable exposure, but live in a distant area and therefore 
be treated as having minimal exposure.   23
and Burton 1996) and to toxic releases (e.g., Brooks and Sethi 1997, Arora and Cason 1999, Ash 
and Fetter 2004).   
However, the negative relation between income and environmental risk is not a universal 
finding. For example, Anderton et al. (1994) report no link between poverty rates and the 
location of waste management facilities in US cities and Harrison and Antweiler (2003) do not 
find an association between income and pollution releases in Canada. Ringquist (2005) conducts 
a meta-analysis to identify the sources of differences in the results; he finds that studies report a 
more negative association with income when they focus on the location of facilities, rather than 
the level of pollution, and a greater association with poverty when the exposure area is narrowly 
defined.  In addition, as research has progressed, it has evolved from descriptive studies into 
causal analyses of the distribution of pollution.
23 When studies report no effect of income, they 
may not mean no unconditional correlation between environmental risk and income, but lack of 
an additional effect beyond the effects of race, population density, education levels, etc.  For 
incidence analysis, however, we may care about the unconditional relationship. 
Literature on other countries is sparse. Pearce (2003) concludes that “while the evidence 
is very limited, the data for the United Kingdom suggest that the existing distribution of risks is 
biased towards the poor (p. 23).” Hamilton (2005) provides a detailed survey of studies from the 
United States and other OECD countries with a focus on risks from hazardous waste, toxic 
chemical releases, and contaminated sites. As in the United States, the studies he surveys mostly 
find greater pollution in poor neighborhoods, but exceptions arise. 
 
Measures of environmental quality  
An important concern with this literature is whether environmental quality is 
appropriately measured. With a slight modification from Pearce (2003), consider a hierarchy of 
measures where each level builds on the previous one: (i) existence of a polluting facility, (ii) 
emissions of pollutants, (iii) ambient concentrations, (iv) exposure (which depends on ambient 
concentrations as filtered through an individual’s behavior), and (v) personal risk (which 
depends on exposure as well as personal characteristics such as age and prior health status).  
                                                 
23 For example, Been (1997) and Wolverton (2002) look at the siting of new facilities  (hazardous waste facilities 
and TRI facilities, respectively) to distinguish inequities in the siting process from the decision of households to 
move near facilities.  They both find that poor neighborhoods are less likely to host new facilities.    24
Unfortunately, exposure and personal risk are not directly observed, and therefore most 
studies use measures (i), (ii), or (iii). Existence of a polluting facility is obviously not an ideal 
measure of emissions, and local emissions may differ greatly from ambient pollution because of 
the timing of releases, possible import/export of emissions from/to neighboring regions, and 
factors such as topography and wind that affect dispersion rates. In the past, concentration data 
was limited to the small number of air pollutants for which a sizable monitoring network is 
available; more recently, ambient measures have been simulated by running emissions data 
through dispersion models (e.g., Shadbegian et al. 2004, Ash and Fetter 2004). However, a 
casual examination of the empirical literature suggests that the choice of emissions versus 
concentration does not affect the association between environmental risks and income, because 
neither measure depends on characteristics of exposed individuals. 
  In contrast, the difference between (iii) and (iv) may well skew the results because rich 
and poor households likely differ in their intentional and unintentional averting behavior. For 
example, low-income individuals may face greater risks from proximity to groundwater 
contamination because they are less likely to use filters or bottled water and may have more 
exposure to air pollution if they are more likely to work in outdoor occupations, such as 
construction. The distinction between (iv) and (v) may also be important because health status, 
and hence susceptibility to pollution-induced illness, bears a close relationship to income.
24 
Thus, the widespread practice of using measures (i) to (iii) instead of (iv) or (v) might lead to 
serious understatement of the income/risk association. 
  A few studies do work with measures of exposure or personal risk. For example, Brajer 
and Hall (1992) find a correlation between income and exposure, where the latter is measured by 
combining pollution data with a behavioral model of time spent in various indoor and outdoor 
activities. Hamilton and Viscusi (1999) find elevated cancer risks for minorities from 
contaminated sites to be cleaned up under the Superfund program, using EPA risk measures that 
depend in part on behavior (they do not report risks by income class). However, the quality of 
the risk measures in these types of studies depends critically on the accuracy of the behavioral 
modeling; more econometric work on such behaviors is needed. 
                                                 
24 For example, asthma, which greatly increases risk from air pollution, is much more prevalent in lower income 
individuals; a recent survey in the United States found adult asthma frequency of 9.8% among persons with family 
incomes of less than $15,000 relative to only 5.9% among persons with family incomes of greater than $75,000 
(CDC 2001).   25
 
Evidence on the Distribution of Improvements from Environmental Policies 
Even if lower income households are disproportionately exposed to existing 
environmental risks, appropriately measured, they may not benefit disproportionately from 
environmental policies if the resulting environmental improvements are non-uniform. A limited 
number of empirical studies have addressed the distribution of improvements from pollution 
control policies. One difficulty in this literature is that the researcher needs to assume a 
counterfactual scenario representing what would have happened in the absence of policy change. 
This problem has been handled in a wide variety of ways.  
    One approach is to focus on changes in environmental quality over time that might be 
largely associated with policies. For example, Kahn (2001) examines changes in air quality at 
monitoring stations in the Los Angeles basin and finds that improvements have been greater in 
low-income census tracts. Such comparisons effectively assume that, without policy 
intervention, pollution would be unchanged. The implication of this assumption for the 
distribution of policy effects is unclear. For example, if pollution would have grown worse 
without policy intervention, it might have exacerbated inequality in existing risks; however, 
worsening pollution might also have spread the risks to relatively clean (and wealthy) 
neighborhoods. 
  A second approach is to simulate policy effects through some more sophisticated 
counterfactual. For example, Shadbegian et al. (2004) examine the distribution of benefits (and 
costs) of the US SO2 allowance-trading program. They compare the actual pattern of emissions 
in 1995 to a “without policy” baseline that applies a utility’s emissions rate before the policy 
(1993) to its output with the policy (1995). They find that the poor received per capita benefits 
that were 5% lower than the average benefits over the whole population: that is, the distribution 
of ambient concentration reductions was slightly regressive. 
  A third approach is to examine the intensity of regulatory effort. Hamilton and Viscusi 
(1999) find some evidence of more aggressive policy responses for low-income communities in 
the Superfund program: target risk levels for cleanup are set lower  (i.e., a more extensive 
cleanup is chosen) when the median income within 1 mile of the site is lower than average. This 
association may reflect behavioral assumptions—regulators could think that low-income 
residents practice less averting behavior and thus require more protection to achieve the same   26
level of safety—but could also reflect special attention to low-income communities because of 
environmental equity concerns.  
Gray and Shadebegian (2004) also study the intensity of regulatory effort, as measured by 
inspection and enforcement effort for air and water pollutants. They find that facilities with 
larger poor populations within 50 miles receive more frequent inspections and less frequent 
enforcement actions. Both these variables potentially measure plants’ compliance, as well as the 
government’s effort, and so are open to several interpretations. Nonetheless, a possibility is that 
the government devotes more attention to inspections near the poor and thus needs to devote less 
attention to enforcement, again supporting the view that government effort is progressively 
distributed. 
 
Relationship Between Environmental Improvements and Welfare 
  Both the large environmental justice literature and the more limited literature on the 
distribution of policy improvements is focused almost entirely on environmental risks. However, 
changes in the pattern of environmental risks may give a misleading picture about changes the 
distribution of household welfare relative to income. This disparity between risks and welfare 
may arise because individuals may value risks differently and because they may be partly 
compensated for changes in risks via market price or wage adjustments. 
Differential valuation of the environment 
Most plausible forms of households’ utility functions have willingness to pay (WTP) for 
environmental improvements that rise with income;
25 however the implication of this positive 
relationship for the distribution of environmental benefits depends critically on the income 
elasticity of WTP for environmental improvements (Ebert, 2003).  If this elasticity is greater than 
unity, the value of a uniform environmental improvement rises relative to income. Although a 
positive income elasticity seems extremely likely a priori, whether the elasticity is greater than 
one is an empirical issue.
26  
                                                 
25 The use of WTP in estimating welfare impacts of policies for different income groups is routine among 
economists, although highly contentious outside of the economics profession (e.g., Heinzerling and Ackerman 
2002). It raises conceptual concerns and political objections, especially when the environmental quality in question 
affects risks of death as it seems to imply that some people are “worth” more than others. 
26 A positive income elasticity of WTP is broadly consistent with the U-shaped relationship between environmental 
quality and per capita income estimated by some studies in the “Environmental Kuznets Curve” literature (Israel and 
Levinson 2004).   27
      Incidentally or intentionally, many studies provide information on this elasticity. 
Contingent valuation (CV) studies, which survey households on their WTP for specific 
environmental goods, often ask about income (among other household characteristics). In a 
survey of such studies in Europe, Kriström and Riera (1996) conclude that the income elasticity 
of WTP is positive but less than one; Hokby and Soderqvist (2003) find similar results from a 
review of CV studies for a range of environmental services in Sweden. Pearce (2003) argues that 
a range of .3 to .7 “seems about right” based his review of international CV studies.
  
A few revealed preference studies also measure income elasticities of WTP but reach 
highly conflicting results. For example, Sieg et al. (2004) estimate a general equilibrium model 
of property price changes in response to air quality improvements and find an income elasticity 
of WTP of more than 4. In contrast, Boyle et al. (1999) find no association between the value of 
lake water clarity in Maine and income among the high-income households, suggesting a WTP 
elasticity of zero! 
 
 Another source of information on the income elasticity of WTP are the hedonic wage 
analyses and surveys used to value health risk reductions. Viscusi and Aldy (2003) summarize 
income elasticities from four previous meta-analyses of value of statistical life studies (Liu et al. 
1997, Mrozek and Taylor 2002, Bowland and Beghin 2001, and Miller 2000) and then conduct 




Market responses to environmental changes 
Household welfare is also affected by changes in market prices that might accompany 
improvements in environmental quality. In particular, environmental improvements might be 
capitalized into housing prices or built into wages through wage premiums for workers with jobs 
in polluted areas (Roback 1982, Blomquist et al. 1988).
28  
Empirical evidence on capitalization in housing prices is widespread from the extensive 
literature on the hedonic valuation of environmental amenities (see for example a meta-analysis 
of studies of air pollution by Smith and Huang 1995). Chay and Greenstone (2005) find a 
substantial housing price effect from recent reductions in total suspended particulates, but also “a 
                                                 
27 Valuations of illness are now beginning to supplement the large literature on death. For example, Dickie and 
Hubbel (2004) estimate an income elasticity of WTP to avoid acute respiratory disease of .5 based on survey data.   28
precisely estimated zero” effect on wages, suggesting that the housing market is the principal 
source of compensation for environmental improvements.  
  Property ownership is skewed toward well-off households; in the United States in 2003, 
73% of households above the poverty line owned homes, compared with 43% of households 
below it (US Census Bureau 2004, Table 964). These differences in ownership rates could have 
dramatic effects on the distribution of benefits. Households that own their home receive the 
benefit of any unanticipated environmental improvement that is fully capitalized, whereas 
households that rent may end up paying higher rental rates. In fact renters may even be made 
worse off on net if increased rental payments outweigh their valuation of the local environmental 
improvement. Evidence of relative out-migration of poorer families from areas of environmental 
improvements supports this possibility (e.g., Sieg, et al. 2004, Banzhaf and Walsh 2004), though 
migration only indicates harm for renters; when families that own homes leave, they take with 
them capital gains from the environmental improvement.  
 
Integrated cost and benefit studies 
Two older studies attempt to integrate cost and benefit distributions to study overall 
incidence. Gianessi et al. (1979) assume the benefits of the 1970 Clean Air Act are proportional 
to emissions reductions.
29 Overall, they find benefits fall short of policy costs (discussed in 
Section 3 above) for all income groups, though the pattern of net losses is only mildly regressive. 
Dorfman (1977) integrated environmental benefits into the Dorfman and Snow (1975) cost 
analysis of all federal environmental regulations (see above), using a survey asking people 
whether they were willing to pay certain dollar amounts for “cleanup of the natural 
environment.” The survey results indicated that wealthier people were willing to pay more 
relative to income; in fact, benefits exceeded costs for the top income quintile, but were less than 
costs for the bottom income quintile. 
                                                                                                                                                             
28 One caveat is that housing prices (or wages) in areas unaffected by environmental quality improvements may also 
change; if dirty regions become cleaner, while clean regions are unaffected, the advantage of living in the latter 
areas are diminished and outward migration from them may lower their property values. Ideally, the distributional 
implications of these other price changes should also be taken into account.  
29 Benefit estimates come from an earlier study where national estimates were allocated to local areas based on an 
index that accounted for local pollution, the population at risk, and land areas. Local pollution was estimated based 
on information about industrial activity, vehicle ownership, and home heating.   29
However, more recent aggregate (rather than distributional) studies find a much more 
favorable benefit-cost comparison for the Clean Air Act, due to stronger evidence on the link 
between pollution and health effects; this underscores the need for updating the earlier analyses. 
  
Summary 
Despite the extensive literature, the existing distribution of environmental risks is still 
controversial; many studies find that the poor face higher risks, but this result appears to be 
sensitive to the nature of the risk studied, with more recent studies chipping away at this as 
stylized fact.  However, if exposure and health sensitivity considerations were adequately 
considered, it would likely tilt existing risks toward the poor. 
   But even if the poor disproportionately bear environmental risks, it does not necessarily 
follow that environmental policies have progressive benefits. Although there are some cases 
where actual policies have tended to skew benefits toward the poor (e.g., Superfund), this finding 
does not apply in other cases (e.g., the SO2 trading program)  
Translating environmental improvements into welfare further muddies the picture. On the 
one hand, most available evidence suggests an income elasticity of WTP below unity, implying 
that the same emissions reduction for rich and poor households would represent a larger share of 
the poor households’ income. On the other hand, capitalization of environmental improvements 
into housing values may disproportionately reduce benefits to low-income households. Much 
work remains to be done on all of these issues.   
  
5. Incorporating Distributional Considerations Into Environmental Cost/Benefit Analysis 
 
  The standard practice among environmental economists⎯as in other fields of 
economics⎯is to keep efficiency and distributional issues separate. Very few cost-benefit 
analyses include more than a cursory mention of distribution, while incidence studies often 
ignore efficiency. There are often important methodological reasons for this separation, because 
models or approaches that work well for efficiency analysis can be completely inadequate for   30
equity analysis, and vice-versa.
30 And if the question is simply whether or not to implement a 
new regulation or tax, this decoupled approach can work well; policymakers can evaluate 
evidence on the aggregate net benefit and on distributional effects from different studies, and 
decide for themselves what weight to put on each. But this approach is inadequate in other cases; 
for example, in order to judge the optimal stringency of a particular policy intervention one must 
either ignore distribution entirely, or utilize an approach that integrates efficiency and equity.
31  
Below, we discuss three such approaches: using a social welfare function or set of 
distributional weights; imposing constraints on the losses that can be imposed on particular 
groups; and using “distribution-neutral” analysis.  
 
Social Welfare Function/Distributional Weights 
 This approach allows the value of a dollar of benefits or costs to vary based on who 
receives that benefits or bears that cost.  One way to do this is to evaluate policy based on how it 
affects social welfare, which is a function of the utility of each individual (i.e., social welfare is 
given by the function  ) , , ( 3 2 1 U U U W , where Ui is utility for individual i). Under this approach, 
concavity with respect to income in either the individual utility functions (i.e., decreasing 
marginal utility per dollar of income), or in the social welfare function (i.e., decreasing marginal 
social welfare per util) causes the marginal social welfare per dollar for any given individual to 
be decreasing in that individual’s income.   
A simplified version of this approach assigns a “distributional weight” for each 
individual, and then calculates the weighted sum of costs and benefits.
32  Distributional weights 
(or values for marginal social welfare per dollar) that decrease with income imply that society 
                                                 
30 Aggregate time-series data sets, for example, can be sufficient for efficiency analysis, but do not include the 
information needed to measure distributional effects. Similarly, distributional analyses often ignore quantity 
responses to price changes, which are key to estimating efficiency effects. 
31 Studies that ignore distribution often justify this as an implementation of the Kaldor-Hicks criterion; if a policy 
passes an unweighted cost-benefit test, then it represents a potential Pareto improvement, because those who benefit 
from the policy could compensate those who lose. But whether the policy improves overall social welfare will also 
depend on its distributional effects. 
It is often argued that environmental policy should not consider distribution, but should focus exclusively 
on efficiency, because tax and transfer policy is a much more direct way to achieve distributional goals. But 
redistribution through taxation of labor and capital, and means-tested benefits, has limits because it involves 
efficiency costs.  To the extent that equity goals are not fully addressed through the tax and benefit system, the 
distributional effects of environmental policies remain a concern.    31
cares about equity as well as efficiency. It is common to set these weights using an isoelastic 
function, which implies that the weight on individual i is equal to  ) / ( ) 1 (
1 1 ε ε ε
− − − Σ − Y Yi i , where 
Y  is mean income and ε  represents society’s aversion to inequality. For ε = 0, the weights are 
constant, equivalent to an unweighted cost-benefit measure; ε = 1 gives weights inversely 
proportional to income; and ε = ∞ implies zero weight on all but the very poorest individual.
33 
This approach is only slightly more complex than standard (unweighted) cost-benefit 
analysis; the social welfare function looks much like an individual utility function, and thus the 
intuition and techniques developed for consumer utility maximization translate easily into social 
welfare maximization. And the distributional weights have an obvious and intuitive 
interpretation. Recent environmental applications of this approach include Fankhauser et al. 
(1997) on the aggregation of projected climate change damages across rich and poor nations; 
Mayeres (2001) on various transportation policies; Parry (2004) on the social costs of emissions 
permits; and literature on optimal environmental taxes with heterogeneous agents (e.g., Cremer 
et al. 1998 and 2003, Eskeland 2000, Mayeres and Proost 1997 and 2001, and Pirttilä and 
Tuomala 1997).  
The major difficulty, of course, comes in determining what set of distributional weights 
to use.  The choice of weights can have a dramatic effect on the magnitude of the change in 
social welfare, and can even alter the sign of that change. One method, analogous to using 
revealed preference to infer individual utility functions, is to infer distributional weights based on 
the tradeoffs made in other government decisions.
34 However, these estimates may be an 
unreliable indicator of society’s true preferences, because policy decisions are not strictly the 
result of benevolent optimization, but are determined at least in part by the interplay of powerful 
interest groups.  
                                                                                                                                                             
32 Note that this weighted cost-benefit measure provides a first-order approximation to the change in social welfare 
if the distributional weight on any given individual equals the marginal social welfare per dollar of income (i.e., if 
the weight for individual i equals  ∂W ∂Ui () ∂Ui ∂Yi ( ), where Yi is that individual’s income).  
33 These weights approximate an isoelastic social welfare function if utility is roughly proportional to income. In this 
case, ε = 0 implies a utilitarian social welfare function, while ε = ∞ implies a Rawlsian social welfare function 
(Atkinson and Stiglitz 1980, pp. 340). 
34 For example, Gruber and Saez (2002) calculate a set of distributional weights that are consistent with the 
efficiency cost of raising income tax revenue from different income groups. It is not always possible to solve this 
“inverse optimum problem”; for example, Ahmad and Stern (1984) could not find a positive set of weights that 
might justify the commodity tax system in India, which implies that commodity tax reform could make all income 
groups better off. 
   32
Alternatively, a set of weights could be chosen that appear reasonable, but that choice is 
inherently arbitrary, and may lead to the acceptance of policies that would perform very badly on 
an unweighted cost/benefit analysis (e.g., Harberger 1976). One possible response to this 
problem is to consider a range of different social welfare functions (e.g., by varying the 
inequality aversion parameter), and look for robust qualitative results (e.g., instrument A always 
yields greater social welfare than instrument B). But such robust results may not exist, and there 




  This approach uses an unweighted cost-benefit measure, but rules out policies that would 
make particular groups worse off. For example, when evaluating an automobile emissions testing 
program, one might impose the constraint that low-income households cannot be made worse 
off.  This would rule out a policy that simply imposes a stringent emissions limitation, because 
many older cars owned by low-income households would fail that test. Some real-world testing 
programs satisfy this distributional constraint by exempting low-income households. But a more 
efficient way to satisfy the constraint would be for the government to offer to buy back those 
older cars, rather than simply banning them, or to compensate low-income households in some 
other way (such as with a tax credit). 
We are not aware of any environmental study that explicitly incorporates distributional 
constraints based on household income. But some studies do impose other distributional 
constraints. For example, recent papers by Bovenberg and Goulder (2001) and Bovenberg et al. 
(2004) examine pollution control costs under the constraint that profits of particular industries do 
not fall.  The rationale for that constraint is that politically powerful industries could block any 
policy that would make them worse off.  In these studies, politically powerful industries are still 
subject to emissions controls, but they receive compensation through rents obtained from the 
allocation of free emission permits 
  Distributional constraints are straightforward to implement, as long as the set of 
constraints is not overly complex. But the choice of constraints will typically be somewhat 
arbitrary. Bovenberg and Goulder’s (2001) analysis, for example, imposes the constraint that 
                                                 
35 For example, Parry (2004) uses values of 0, 0.5, and 1 for the inequality aversion parameter ￿, Cremer at al. 
(1998) uses 0.1 and 1.9, and Fankhauser et al. (1997) uses 0, 1, and ∞.   33
utilities and fossil fuel producers cannot suffer a net loss from policies to reduce carbon 
emissions, but imposes no such constraint on other industries or consumer groups.  
Another problem is that satisfying the distributional constraints could potentially be very 
costly in terms of economic efficiency. In theory, distributional constraints could lead to the 
rejection of policies that generate tiny losses for a favored group, even if they produce huge 
benefits for other (non-favored) groups. A more practical example is the policy mentioned above 
that exempts low-income households from auto emissions testing. This policy is inefficient 
because it fails to exploit potential reductions in emissions from those households’ cars that, in 
the absence of distributional concerns, would probably be the most cost-effective reductions 
available. And in the Bovenberg and Goulder and Bovenberg et al. papers efficiency losses result 
because compensation schemes erode the amount of government revenue collected from 
auctioned permits (or emission taxes) that can be used to finance cuts in other distortionary taxes. 
Moreover, in these studies the fraction of permits (or of emissions tax revenue) that must be used 
for compensation increases with the level of abatement; indeed, beyond a certain reduction in 





The distribution-neutral approach evaluates a particular policy by creating a hypothetical 
“neutralized” version of that policy⎯one with no distributional effects⎯and seeing if that policy 
passes a cost-benefit test.  As proposed by Kaplow (1996, 2004), this entails two steps. The first 
is to calculate what changes to the income tax schedule would exactly compensate each income 
group for the effects of the policy, thereby neutralizing the distributional effects of the policy. 
This would require a compensating income tax cut for any income group that would suffer a loss 
from the policy, and a compensating tax increase for any group that would receive a gain. Thus, 
the combination of the policy in question and the compensating changes in the tax schedule 
would leave each income group no better or worse off than in the status quo. The second step is 
to estimate whether that combination⎯the policy in question plus the compensating income tax 
changes⎯would increase or decrease net government revenue. If it would increase net revenue, 
then it is possible to make all income groups better off (by distributing the excess revenue as a   34
lump-sum transfer). But if it would decrease net revenue, then the opposite result holds: the 
government could not possibly compensate everyone who is made worse off by the policy, even 
if it were to tax away all of the gains from those who benefit from the policy.
36 
Williams (2004) provides the first empirical application of this approach, using it to 
calculate the optimal gasoline tax. The gasoline tax is regressive, so neutralizing its distributional 
effects requires making the income tax schedule more progressive, which has an efficiency 
cost.
37 Consequently, the distribution-neutral approach yields a lower optimal gasoline tax rate 
(which Williams estimates at $0.91 per gallon in 1997 dollars) that is lower than the efficiency-
maximizing tax rate (estimated at $1.03 per gallon). 
  Thus, this approach provides a way to bring distributional considerations into cost-benefit 
analysis, while still avoiding the problems inherent in the previous two approaches. It is similar 
in concept to the Hicks-Kaldor criterion in that it looks for a potential Pareto improvement, but it 
accounts for the efficiency costs of redistribution, whereas the Hicks-Kaldor criterion implicitly 
assumes that redistribution is costless.  
However, just because the income tax schedule could be adjusted to prevent anyone 
being made worse off doesn’t necessarily mean that it will be (of course, the same criticism 
applies to Hicks-Kaldor). A more serious problem is that the compensation might not even be 
possible; if there is heterogeneity within an income group, such that some people in this group 
gain from a policy while others lose, then the income tax cannot neutralize distributional effects 
within that group.
38   
Another potential problem is that distribution-neutral analysis can be complicated to 
implement when the welfare effects of a policy are a nonlinear function of income. The cost 
would be nonlinear if the income elasticity of demand for the polluting good varies across the 
income distribution (as is the case for gasoline, which has an income elasticity less than one over 
                                                 
36 This approach implicitly takes into account the efficiency costs of redistribution, because the compensation comes 
not from individual-specific lump-sum taxes and transfers, but rather from changes in the income tax schedule, and 
thus may change the excess burden of the income tax. 
37 The compensating change in the income tax schedule depends on the distribution of benefits as well as the 
distribution of costs. However Williams (2004) assumes that the external benefits of lower gasoline consumption are 
proportional to income, so compensating for those benefits does not affect the progressivity of the income tax. 
38 This problem arises in Williams (2004), because at any given income level, some households use more gasoline 
than others, and bear more of the burden of increases in the gasoline tax. Thus, while the tax schedule can be 
adjusted so that for any level of income, the average household at that level is exactly compensated for the increased 
gasoline tax, this will undercompensate households that use more gasoline than the average for their income level, 
and will overcompensate those that use less than average.   35
most of the income distribution, but greater than one near the bottom of the income distribution, 
where owning a car is a luxury). The environmental benefits are nonlinear if the income 
elasticity of WTP varies over the income distribution, or if exposure to a pollutant varies 
nonlinearly with income. In any of these cases, the hypothetical compensating change in the 
income tax schedule will also be nonlinear, and evaluating the efficiency effects of that 
compensating change will be complicated. 
Surprisingly, Kaplow (2004) shows that distribution-neutral analysis yields the same 
result as one would get by ignoring both distributional effects and interactions with pre-existing 
tax distortions. Thus, he argues that imposing distribution neutrality might actually simplify cost-
benefit analysis. However Williams (2005) shows that this result holds only under a restricted 
specification for utility, which is frequently rejected in empirical studies. 
 
Conclusions 
  Given the drawbacks of each of these approaches, they should be used with caution. In 
most cases, it is better to provide separate measures of the efficiency and equity effects of a 
policy than to attempt to integrate them into a single measure. However there are some problems, 
such as calculating socially optimal policies, for which an integrated measure may be 
appropriate. In such cases, the best approach for a given problem will depend on the 
characteristics of the problem. If distributional effects matter primarily because of political 
concerns (i.e., imposing too heavy a burden on a particular group will cause that group to block 
the policy), then it is straightforward to represent those concerns as distributional constraints.   
On the other hand, if distributional effects matter primarily for equity reasons, then using 
distributional weights or distribution-neutral analysis will likely be the best approaches. Because 
it does not rely on an arbitrary assumption about society’s aversion to inequality, distribution-
neutral analysis can provide the most rigorous and objective results, but only if it is applied 
without imposing unrealistic restrictions on preferences⎯and it can be very complicated to 
implement without those restrictions.  Often, a simpler approach will be needed, and in such 
cases the best option is probably to use distributional weights based on an isoelastic function, and 
to consider a wide range of possible values for the inequality aversion parameter. 
 
6. Lessons Learned And Topics For Future Research   36
 
  Although in general (with some exceptions) low-income households appear to bear a 
disproportionate share of existing environmental risks, policies that reduce environmental risks 
are not necessarily progressive. For example, the geographic pattern of emissions reductions may 
be uneven, and induced changes in property values may indirectly benefit the wealthy at the 
expense of the poor. Moreover, (again with some exceptions) the costs of environmental policies 
tend to fall most heavily on poorer groups through increases in product prices, as energy goods 
are necessities. And the type of emissions control instrument can be critically important; freely 
allocated tradable emission permits may actually hurt the poor the most, as they transfer income 
to shareholders via scarcity rents created at the expense of higher prices. On the other hand, 
emissions taxes (or auctioned emission permits) offer the opportunity to offset regressive effects, 
if revenues are recycled to finance progressive changes to the tax system.  
Revenue-raising environmental policies have, however, proven extremely difficult to 
implement in the United States; recent legislation has instead favored grandfathered emissions 
permits where policy rents accrue to regulated firms.
39 Although the chance of new 
environmental or energy taxes being introduced in the next few years appears very remote, it is 
conceivable that this situation may change further down the road, given continuing pressures to 
“do something” about US greenhouse gas emissions and looming deficit problems from retiring 
baby boomers.  
Although literature on incidence of pollution control policies has been expanding rapidly 
in recent years, the above discussion reveals that existing analysis is very thin, or even non-
existent, in a wide range of critical areas. We finish by summarizing a variety of topics in 
particular need of attention. 
  Empirical studies on the extent to which the costs of environmental policies are passed 
forward into higher prices of consumer products would be extremely valuable; at present, 
empirical analyses typically assume 100% pass-through based on the assumption of competitive, 
constant returns production.
40 Also on the cost side, there is a need for more unifying analyses 
that compare the incidence of a broad range of alternative control instruments for a particular 
                                                 
39 The McCain/Lieberman bill to reduce carbon emissions, and recent EPA rulings to reduce utility emissions of 
SO2, NOX and mercury, would primarily grandfather permits to existing emission sources. 
40 There is an empirical literature on the pass-through of taxes into consumer prices in contexts other than 
environmental policy (see Fullerton and Metcalf 2002, section 2.6).   37
pollutant (taxes, permits, technology mandates, etc.) on a consistent basis. And how relative 
incidence effects of policies depend on factors such as the extent of pollution reduction, 
abatement cost heterogeneity among firms, changes in relative factor prices, non-competitive 
pricing, and differences in emissions intensity between marginal and infra-marginal production, 
all need to be explored. This research effort would aid policymakers in gauging when the choice 
of instrument is important for distributional concerns and when it is not.  
  A related issue is the extent to which adverse distributional impacts might be offset via 
targeted tax reductions from the recycling of revenue raised from emissions taxes and auctioned 
permits. It would also be useful to examine the efficiency gains forgone by targeting tax 
reductions to specific income groups, in place of more broadly based tax reductions. Again, 
research on these issues would inform policymakers about the strength of the economic case for 
using revenue-raising policies in preference to grandfathered permit trading programs.  
  On the benefit side, research should address the distribution of physical environmental 
benefits from policy changes (as opposed to the existing distribution of environmental risks), 
ideally with account taken of how health effects depend on exposure and personal characteristics. 
And to quantify the pattern of welfare gains from environmental improvements, these estimates 
need to be merged with estimates of the willingness to pay for environmental quality across 
households, as well as estimates of potentially offsetting effects from price adjustments in 
housing markets. 
Moreover, very few studies integrate both the benefit and cost side of particular 
environmental regulations, in order to obtain the distribution of overall welfare effects across 
household groups. The last comprehensive study of the incidence of federal environmental 
regulations uses data from the 1970s.  
Finally, further development of alternative approaches for incorporating distributional 
considerations into cost/benefit analyses is needed. Many problems require an integrated analysis 
of efficiency and equity, but the choice of distributional weights or distributional constraints is 
arbitrary. Distribution-neutral analysis avoids that problem, but is difficult to implement except 
under very restrictive assumptions. Progress in this area⎯a less arbitrary means of determining 
distributional weights or constraints, a simpler and more general method for distribution-neutral 
analysis, or an entirely new approach altogether⎯would be very valuable. 
   38
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